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Theabilitytocontrolanimmediateimpulseinreturnforamoredesirable–thoughdelayed–
outcome has long been thought to be a uniquely human feature. However, studies on
non-human primates revealed that some species are capable of enduring delays in order to
get food of higher quality or quantity. Recently two corvid species, common raven (Corvus
corax) and carrion crow (Corvus corone corone), exchanged food for a higher quality reward
though seemed less capable of enduring delays when exchanging for the same food type
in a higher quantity. In the present study, we speciﬁcally investigated the ability of carrion
crows to overcome an impulsive choice in a quantitative exchange task. After a short delay,
individuals were asked to give back an initial reward (cheese) to the human experimenter
in order to receive a higher amount of the same reward (two, four, or eight pieces). We
tested six captive crows – three individuals never exchanged the initial reward for a higher
quantity; the other three birds did exchange though at very low rates. We performed a
preference test between one or more pieces of cheese in order to address whether crow
poor performance could be due to an inability to discriminate between different quantities
ornotattributingahighervaluetothehigherquantities.Allbirdschosethehigherquantities
signiﬁcantly more often, indicating that they can discriminate between quantities and that
higher quantities are more desirable.Taken together, these results suggest that, although
crows may possess the cognitive abilities to judge quantities and to overcome an impulsive
choice, they do so only in order to optimize the qualitative but not quantitative output in
the exchange paradigm.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to overcome an impulsive choice-deﬁned as the choice
of the less desirable, immediate option, over a more desirable
though delayed one (Rachlin, 1974), has long been thought to
be a uniquely human feature (Burns and Powers, 1975; Logue,
1988; Rachlin, 2000). Impulse control develops slowly in chil-
dren (Mischel et al.,1989) and often represents serious difﬁculties
to non-human animals (Stephens and Anderson, 2001; Stevens
etal.,2005;EvansandBeran,2007a;Andersonetal.,2010).Thisis
particularly true for several bird species, which hardly control an
impulsivechoiceforlongerthanafewsecondsinexperimentalsit-
uations(pigeons,Columbalivia:Ainslie,1974;Mazur,1987;Logue
etal.,1988;Greenetal.,2004;Africangrayparrots,Psittacuseritha-
cus: Vick et al., 2010; domestic fowl, Gallus gallus: Abeyesinghe
et al.,2005).
The difﬁculties of non-human animals in controlling impulses
seem to reﬂect primarily a cognitive problem. From an evolution-
aryperspective,choicesoptimizinglong-termgainoverimmediate
beneﬁts in foraging (Stephens and Krebs, 1986; Kacelnik, 2003)
or mating situations (Stephens and Krebs, 1986; Stevens, 2010)
shouldbeselectedforand,thus,foundinavarietyofspecies.How-
ever, several authors suggest that in some contexts, delaying food
intakes might add additional risk to survival. In those cases, a fast
discounting of food value over time,i.e.,a preference for immedi-
acy,maybethemostadaptivestrategy(Kageletal.,1986;Stephens,
2008) and choices in several species have been described not to be
consistent with rate maximization (Stevens and Mühlhoff, 2012).
In term of the mechanisms involved,the capacity of an individual
to overcome an impulsive choice may depend on the subjective
value of the expected reward (Mitchell and Wilson, 2010) relative
to the amount of the reward (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996; Green
et al., 1997; Bateson, 2002a), its quality (Bruce et al., 2010), and
in relation to the delay until the reward is received (Green et al.,
1999, 2004).
The effects of delay in gratiﬁcation on self-control are fairly
well investigated in primates. In classical delay of gratiﬁcation
tasks, subjects are given a choice between an immediate reward
of low value and a delayed option of higher value. Once the
choice is made they cannot revert their decision and have to wait
for the whole duration of the delay before obtaining the larger
reward. In these circumstances, only great apes accept delays over
a minute (great apes: Rosati et al., 2007; long-tailed macaque:
Tobin et al., 1996; rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta: Szalda-
Petree et al., 2004). By contrast, other techniques allow subjects
www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 118 | 1Wascher et al. Impulsive choice in carrion crows
to reevaluate their choice during the delay. This is the case in
delay maintenance tasks such as accumulation tasks where sub-
ject can stop an accumulation of food rewards by reaching for
them, and in delayed exchange tasks where individuals endowed
with an initial low value item can give up (consume the item) at
any time during the delay prior to being asked to exchange it for
a higher value food. In both the delayed exchange task (chim-
panzees, Pan troglodytes: Dufour et al., 2007; brown capuchin
monkeys,Cebus apella: Drapier et al.,2005; long-tailed macaques,
Macaca fascicularis: Pelé et al., 2010) and in the accumulation
task (chimpanzees: Beran and Evans,2009; orangutan,Pongo pyg-
maeus:Beran,2002)individuals’abilitytoovercometheimpulsive
choice decreases with increasing delay time. In those studies, the
typeandamountofthefoodrewardaffectsthesubjects’responses.
Generally, they endure longer delays with high qualities and high
quantities. Great apes and children have even been described to
engageinself-distractivebehaviors,probablyinanattempttobet-
tercopewithlongdelays(EvansandBeran,2007b;Steelandtetal.,
2012).
The low performance of birds compared to primates in self-
control tasks questions whether birds evaluate the value of a
reward differently or if they are generally more impulsive. In
the present study, we investigated whether carrion crows (Corvus
corone corone) could overcome an impulsive choice in order to
maximize the quantity of their reward. Corvids are expected to
be better at impulse control than most bird species tested so far,
as they are renowned for their cognitive skills during competi-
tion for hidden food (Emery and Clayton, 2004; Bugnyar and
Heinrich, 2005; Clayton and Emery, 2005). Like other corvids,
crows engage in scatter-hoarding. This means that in everyday
life, they routinely delay immediate consumption and store food
for future use (Glutz von Blotzheim, 1985; Heinrich and Pepper,
1998). In contrast to long-term cachers, crows frequently retrieve
their caches fairly quickly (minutes to hours; personal observa-
tion) or up to a couple of days (Waite, 1985; Fjeld and Sonerud,
1988) after the caches have been made. In a previous study, we
tested the willingness of crows and ravens to exchange a non-
preferred food (bread) against a more desirable reward (grape,
cheese, and sausage). In this task, birds could overcome their
impulsive response to eat the immediately available food for more
than just a few seconds and in some trials two birds even waited
up to a couple of minutes (Dufour et al., 2012). However, along
with the qualitative exchange task, we ran quantitative exchange
training and in the latter found the birds failed to exchange one
pieceof cheeseforahigherquantity(Wascher,C.A.F.,andBraun,
A., unpublished data). Here, we followed up on the birds appar-
ent problem at maximizing a quantitative income. We tested if
carrion crows can control their impulsivity in an exchange task
in order to maximize the quantity of their reward. To control for
preferences based on quantitative assessment,we also ran a binary
food choice task,where individuals were asked to choose between
the options one vs. two, one vs. four, and one vs. eight pieces of
cheese. By doing so, we aimed at determining whether any fail-
ure to respond in the context of quantitative maximization would
rely on a lack of impulse control or on a failure to discriminate
quantities.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
STUDY SUBJECTS AND KEEPING
Seven captive crows (three females, four males) were involved in
this study. Although they differed in origin, age, and experience
with humans (Table 1), they were all tame and already used to
experimental testing in physical and visual isolation (see below).
Crows were held in large outdoor aviaries (15–45m2) at the Kon-
rad Lorenz Forschungsstelle (KLF) in Austria. At the time of the
study,theywerekeptinthreeadjacentsubgroups,consistingoftwo
male–female pairs and a trio of two males and one female. One
male (“Hugo”) did not learn to exchange a token with a human
experimenter; therefore only six individuals participated in the
exchangeexperiment(TaskA),whereasallsevenbirdsparticipated
in the quantity discrimination experiment (Task B).
EXPERIMENTS
Experiments were conducted from February until April 2010. We
performedtwodailysessions–oneoftask(A)andoneoftask(B)–
in counterbalanced order between 0800–1000 and 1600–1800. All
birds voluntarily participated in the experiments,entering the test
compartment after being called by name. They were fed twice a
day (morning and late afternoon, after the experiments) with a
mixture of meat, milk products, vegetables, and fruits and had
ad libitum access to water.All procedures were in accordance with
the laws of Austria and the federal State of Upper Austria.
Table 1 | List of crows participating in the present study.
Individual Year of birth Sex Upbringing At KLF since Experience
Hugo 1989 M Handraised, singly by private person 2008 Choice2
Peter 2007 F Handraised, singly by private person 2007 Exchange1; choice2
Gabi 2007 F Handraised, singly by private person 2007 Exchange1; choice2
Franz 2007 M Wild; came into captivity because of insured wing 2008 Exchange1
Baerchen 2008 M Handraised, singly by private person 2008 Exchange1; choice2
Toeffel 2008 F Handraised, in social group at KLF 2008 Exchange1
Klaus 2009 M Handraised, singly by private person 2009 Choice2
1Individuals participating in the qualitative exchange task by Dufour et al. (2012);
2Individuals participating in the choice task by Mikolasch et al. (2012).
All birds were wild-caught, handraised by private people (except “Franz”) at different locations inAustria and Germany and given to the Konrad Lorenz Forschungsstelle
(KLF) between 2007 and 2009. M, male; F , female.
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Task (A): exchange task
From spring 2007 to fall 2009, we successfully trained six carrion
crows to exchange a token (stone or piece of wood) for food with
a human experimenter via progressive behavioral shaping. It took
thebirdsapproximately25–30sessionsof eighttrialseachtolearn
how to exchange. Once a bird exchanged in 80% of the trials over
two consecutive sessions, the training procedure was considered
to be complete.
Crows were tested individually, separated from the exper-
imenter (Claudia A. F. Wascher) by a wire mesh. Individ-
uals were presented the initial item (one piece of cheese;
5mm×3mm×1mm) in one hand (left and right in counter-
balanced order) and a higher number of cheese pieces (two, four,
or eight) in the other hand. The initial item was given to the sub-
ject and after a short delay (approximately 2s) individuals were
given the chance to exchange the initial item in order to receive
the larger amount of cheese. In order to succeed, birds had to put
the initial item into the open palm of the experimenter. During
this sequence the reward was visible for the crow. We conducted
12 sessions, consisting of nine trials each, offering each quantity
(two,four,andeight)threetimespersessioninrandomizedorder.
Task (B): preference task
Individuals were familiar with different forms of two-choice stud-
ies(Mikolaschetal.,2012;Braun,A.,andBugnyar,T.,unpublished
data)andhadalreadybeeninvolvedinfoodpreferencetaskswhere
they had to choose between two food items differing in quality by
pointing with their beak. For the current study, they were given
the opportunity to choose between two different amounts of the
same highly desirable food reward. Each amount was presented
in the hands of the human experimenter (Claudia A. F. Wascher)
until birds indicated their chosen option. During each trial, the
experimenter gazed at the ground in order to avoid giving cues
to the focal individual. Note that we explicitly tested the same
crows for using human-given cues in a choice experiment, which
they failed to do (Cibulski, L., unpublished data). The different
amounts were presented as followed:one vs. two,one vs. four,one
vs. eight pieces of cheese reward. We ran 12 sessions consisting of
nine trials, with each quantity (two, four, and eight pieces) being
offered three times in randomized order. The hand (left/right),
which presented the higher quantity, was counterbalanced across
session.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
To test whether the birds’ choice for the higher quantity deviated
from chance level in task (B) we applied binomial tests. A Fried-
man test and post hoc Wilcoxon signed rank tests were conducted
to investigate differences in performance between different condi-
tions(onevs.two,onevs.four,onevs.eight).Testswereconducted
two-tailed and considered signiﬁcant when p <0.05. Statistical
analysis was conducted using SPSS 19.0 statistical package.
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT (A): EXCHANGE TASK
Crows performed at very low levels in all three conditions of this
experiment (Figure 1A). From six birds tested, three individu-
als never successfully exchanged one piece of cheese for a larger
FIGURE1|P e r f o r mance of carrions crows in the quantitative exchange
task (A) and in the preference test (B). In task (B), individuals chose
higher quantities signiﬁcantly more often than expected by chance in
condition one vs. four and one vs. eight. Dashed line represents 50%
chance; full lines represent signiﬁcance levels (p <0.05).
amount of cheese. The remaining three individuals exchanged at
low frequencies (Table 2). Out of a total of 108 trials, individual
1 (“Gabi”) had one successful trial in the condition ×8; individ-
ual 2 (“Toeffel”) had ﬁve successful trials in the conditions ×4
and ×8; individual three (“Franz”) had 13 successful trials spread
betweenallthreeconditions(Figure1A).Table 2 alsoliststheper-
formance of the crows in the qualitative exchange task of Dufour
et al. (2012). It is notable that the two individuals that exchanged
more than once in the current task were not among the best in the
qualitative exchange task.
EXPERIMENT (B): PREFERENCE TASK
In contrast to experiment (A), individuals behaved consistently
in task (B). Crows chose the higher quantities signiﬁcantly above
chanceintheconditionsonevs.four(Binomialtest:p =0.01)and
one vs. eight (Binomial test: p =0.001). In condition one vs. two
individuals chose the higher quantity more than 50% of the time
thoughnotsigniﬁcantlydifferentfromchance(mean:22.4correct
choices out of 36 trials; Binomial test: p =0.243, Figure 1B).
The individuals choice of bigger quantities differed signiﬁ-
cantly across conditions (Friedman: N =7, χ2 =8.857, df=2,
p =0.008). Speciﬁcally, crows chose the higher quantities more
often in the one vs. eight and one vs. four compared to the one vs.
twocondition(Wilcoxonsignedranktest:N =7,onevs.two–one
vs. four: T+ =27,p =0.028; one vs. two – one vs. eight:T+ =28,
p =0.018; only the latter remains signiﬁcant after Bonferroni cor-
rection). Performance did not differ between one vs. four and one
vs. eight condition (Wilcoxon signed rank test: N =7, T+ =20,
p =0.307).
DISCUSSION
The results of the present study show that carrion crows are able
to discriminate quantities in a two-choice preference task and, as
expected, prefer larger quantities. Nevertheless, they do not per-
form above chance when asked to exchange one piece of food
for a higher quantity of the same reward. These ﬁndings indi-
cate that crows have problems in overcoming impulsive choice
in the context of quantity to maximize the number of rewards
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T a b l e2|E x c hange performance (percentage of successful exchanges at 2s delay) of crows tested in the quantitative exchangeTask (A) of the
current study and the qualitative exchange task of Dufour et al. (2012).
Individuals Quantitative exchange:Task (A) Qualitative exchange:
Dufour et al. (2012)
% Success (reward condition:session no.:Trial no.) % Success Delay up to (s)
Gabi 0.93 (×4:S5:T8) 83.33 320
Toeffel 4.63 (×4:S1:T9;S2:T6; S10:T6; ×8:S2:T4; S3:T5) 66.67 20
Franz 12.03 (×2:S3:T6; S4:T4 andT9; S6:T5; ×4:S2:T2 andT3; S3:T4; S9:T8; ×8:S3:T2; S4:T5,T7 , andT8; S6:T6) 11.43 2
Baerchen 0 52.38 160
Peter 0 85.42 320
Klaus 0 ––
Individual 6 (“Klaus”) did not participate in the qualitative exchange study because of his young age.
gained. Surprisingly, the same birds performed well in a qualita-
tiveexchangetask,notonlyovercominganinitialimpulsivenessin
order to exchange, but also coping with extended delays in order
to optimize the quality of the gained food reward (Dufour et al.,
2012). This suggests that, although carrion crows generally have
the cognitive capacities to overcome an impulsive choice, their
motivation to do so is strongly dependent on context. In the cur-
rent task, they seemingly do not attribute quantity a high enough
value to be willing to exchange for a higher number of rewards.
The question arises if the two chosen tasks of the present study
deliver reliable results. The ﬁndings of our two-choice task are in
accordance with other studies on quantity judgment and number
competenceincorvids(Koehler,1941;Ujfalussy,D.J.,unpublished
data). Moreover, the very same crows performed poorly in a par-
allel experiment testing their use of human-given cues (Cibulski,
L., unpublished data). Together, this suggests that crows’ consis-
tent choice of higher quantities in the current experiment is due
to their discrimination ability of quantities rather than any form
of cueing. Focusing on our main result, the failure of the crows
in exchanging food for higher quantities, we are conﬁdent that
thiscannotbeattributedtoproblemswiththeexchangeparadigm
perse.Birdshadbeentrainedtoexchange2yearspriorthepresent
study and successfully participated in a number of studies apply-
ing this speciﬁc paradigm (Dufour et al., 2012; Wascher, C. A. F.,
and Bugnyar,T.,unpublished data). The food exchange paradigm
was therefore not new to them, and similarly lack of experience
with this task or with the use of food rather than tokens can-
not explain their performances. It is particularly interesting that
individual performance in the qualitative exchange experiment of
Dufour et al. (2012) did not correlate with the birds’performance
in the quantitative exchange. Of the two crows performing best
in the qualitative exchange, one never exchanged in the quantita-
tive exchange and one individual exchanged in a single out of 108
trials. The most successful individual in the quantitative exchange
(13 successful out of 108 trials) was among the worst performing
individuals in the qualitative exchange (Table 2).
Instudiesinvestigatingquantitydiscriminationinnon-human
animals,ithasbeensuggestedthatthepreferenceforhigherquan-
tities is caused by the need for optimization of the outcome
(Boysen and Berntson, 1989; Boysen, 1997; Agrillo et al., 2007).
Although, when it comes to foraging decisions, the choice made
byindividualshasbeenshowntobemorerelatedtocontextrather
than absolute regarding of the reward’s value (Bateson, 2002b;
Bateson et al., 2002, 2003; Shaﬁr et al., 2002). Our results sup-
port these ﬁndings in so far as crows do not generally overcome
the impulsive choice in order to optimize the size of the reward
though do so in the context of quality.
It is possible that our feeding regime has removed the birds
from experiencing hunger so they could afford to become more
selective in selection of food types. Still,it is surprising that crows,
as a food-caching species, appear to be insensitive to maximizing
quantity of highly preferred food. In the present study, individu-
als did engage in food-caching approximately as frequently as in
other experiments using the exchange paradigm (Wascher, C. A.
F., unpublished data) with the consequence that they were usu-
ally caching one rather than many pieces per event. Possibly, as
short-term cachers, crows are tuned to pay attention to food of
different qualities (Raby et al., 2007) rather than quantities. For
carrions crows and maybe birds in general it might be critical for
survival to be able to ﬂy away quickly without being handicapped
by large loads. Therefore individuals attending less to quantity
than to quality of the prospected income might have been favored
by natural selection. If this is true, similar cognitive constraints
could be expected in other food-caching species.
It is known that the incentive to cache is affected by the qual-
ity of food (Clayton and Dickinson, 1999). This could affect the
results of our study in two ways: the food we used (cheese) was
not preferred enough by the crows to optimize quantity. However,
we consider this option as highly unlikely because cheese turned
out to be one of the most preferred food items in several studies
(Dufour et al., 2012) and in order to maintain its high value, it is
given to the birds only during experiments. Alternatively, cheese
was too preferred and crows could not inhibit the impulse to eat
a single piece of it,once having it already in their beak. This could
certainly be the case. However, we chose highly preferred food to
ensure a motivation to participate. Future studies are needed to
disentangle effects of food quality.
The endowment effect, in which individuals favor an item
more when they possess it, could offer a potential explanation
for the behavior of the crows in the present study. This effect
has previously been described in humans (Kahneman et al.,
1991),chimpanzees(Brosnanetal.,2007),andcapuchinmonkeys
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(Lakshminarayanan et al.,2008). In the present study this would
mean that the birds did not exchange one piece of cheese for
higher quantities because they may have valued the one item they
already possessed more than the expected reward. Further stud-
ies are necessary to test this assumption, for example by applying
another experimental paradigm like the accumulation task,which
has been used in various primate species (Beran, 2002; Beran and
Evans, 2006, 2009; Evans and Beran, 2007a; Pelé et al., 2011) and
recently also in parrots (Vick et al., 2010). Similar to the results
of our study, parrots performed badly in overcoming an impul-
sivechoiceinordertooptimizethequantitativeoutput.Thishints
toward similarities between parrots and crows regarding the eval-
uation of food,anyhow parrots ability to delay gratiﬁcation in the
context of quality has yet to be tested.
In conclusion, carrion crows are able to discriminate quanti-
ties (experiment B) and they are able to control their immediate
impulseswhenhavingthechancetoexchangefoodforbetterfood
(Dufour et al., 2012). However, crows rarely exchange food for a
higheramountofthesamefoodtype(experimentA).Thiscontext
dependence in exchange performance stands in contrast to recent
ﬁndings in primates (Ramseyer et al., 2006; Dufour et al., 2007;
Pelé et al., 2010) and leaves us with two mutually not exclusive
interpretations: (i) motivational differences due to daily feeding
and/or this particular testing regime and (ii) species differences
regarding evaluation of food.
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